Know Your Rights: Hacked or Blackmailed With Your Photos? What Law 175/2018 Criminalizes, and Where to Report It
A message arrives after midnight from a nameless account, carrying a photo, a threat to publish it, and a demand for money. That is exactly where this guide begins: what Egypt's Anti-Cybercrime Law No. 175 of 2018 criminalizes under Articles 14, 15, 24, 25 and 26, how to preserve digital evidence before it is lost, and where — and by whom — a report can be filed.

It is around 1:30 in the morning, the house has gone quiet, and the only sound left is the fan, when the phone lights up on the pillow with a message from an account with no name and no profile picture. Attached is a screenshot of a private photo, and beneath it a single line: pay up or I post it. In those first minutes the walls seem to close in, and the person on the receiving end feels utterly alone in the world — so they do one of two things: pay quietly, or delete everything, switch off the phone, and pretend the night never happened. Both reactions serve only the blackmailer.
This article is not about preventive security settings or personal-data protection — we have already covered that, in a separate piece on Law No. 151 of 2020. Here we start from the moment after the harm has occurred: the account has actually been hacked, or the photo is already in the hands of someone waving it as a threat. From that point, three questions matter, and only three: what exactly does the law criminalize? How is digital evidence preserved before it is lost? And where — and by whom — can a report be filed?
The primary reference is Law No. 175 of 2018 on Combating Information Technology Crimes. It was issued on 14 August 2018 and came into force the very next day, 15 August, as recorded in the legislative database of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). This means that what happens on a screen is not a legal grey zone; it is governed by specific articles carrying defined penalties, and the Public Prosecution investigates it just as it would any other crime.
The story usually begins with unauthorized entry. Article 14 punishes with imprisonment of not less than one year and a fine of not less than 50,000 Egyptian pounds and not more than 100,000 — or either penalty alone — anyone who deliberately and without right accesses a website, a private account, or an information system whose access is restricted; the penalty is harsher if the intrusion results in data being erased, altered, or destroyed. This is the article that catches a former partner or colleague who keeps a password and logs in without permission — knowing the password is not the same as having the right to use it. Article 15 covers a different situation: someone who was originally granted access — an employee with limited privileges, or a person entrusted with managing a page — but who then exceeds the time or level of access permitted. The penalty here is imprisonment of not less than six months and a fine of between 30,000 and 50,000 pounds.
And if the offender does not stop at gaining access but goes on to create an account or email address falsely attributed to you, that is a standalone crime under Article 24: imprisonment of not less than three months and a fine of between 10,000 and 30,000 pounds. If the fake account is then used to harm the person whose name it carries, the penalty rises to imprisonment of not less than one year and a fine of between 50,000 and 200,000 pounds. In other words, the mere existence of a page bearing your name and photo that you did not create is itself something to report — there is no need to wait and see what that page goes on to publish.
Next comes the core of what a victim fears most: their privacy. Article 25 punishes with imprisonment of not less than six months and a fine of between 50,000 and 100,000 pounds — or either penalty — anyone who violates the sanctity of private life or discloses private conversations, photos, or information. The same article separately criminalizes, as a distinct offense in its own right rather than merely a form of privacy violation, sending a large volume of electronic messages repeatedly to a specific person without their consent. In other words, an unrelenting flood of messages is not simply an annoyance to be endured; the text criminalizes that behavior on its own, before anything is even published.
The harshest provision in this chapter is Article 26. It punishes with imprisonment of not less than two years and not more than five years, and a fine of between 100,000 and 300,000 pounds — or either penalty — anyone who deliberately uses software or an information technology tool to process another person's personal data in order to link it to content that violates public decency, or to present it in a way that damages that person's honor or reputation. The provision covers more than doctored images alone, even though a manipulated photo is its clearest application; in practical terms, the fact that an image is fabricated does not remove the offender from the scope of the crime — it places them squarely within its harshest bracket.
Then there is the act of threatening itself. Alongside the Information Technology Crimes Law, there is also the Penal Code, including Article 327, which punishes with imprisonment anyone who threatens another person in writing with a crime against their person or property, or with disclosing or attributing to them matters that harm their honor, when that threat is accompanied by a demand or an order to do something. According to Egyptian newspapers reporting in December 2025 on Cassation Appeal No. 7094 of Judicial Year 95, the Court of Cassation ruled that the word "writing" in this article is worded broadly enough to cover all means of writing, whether traditional or electronic. The practical takeaway is that a threatening message is not evidence against the victim, as many mistakenly believe — it is evidence against the perpetrator.
This brings us to the first rule: do not pay. Paying ends nothing, because it proves to the blackmailer that the method works and that the victim can be squeezed again in two weeks, and again in a month — and it draws them into transfers and wallets that are hard to trace. The second rule is harder to follow: do not delete. The first instinct of someone in a panic is to delete the conversation and block the account, which erases with their own hands the only evidence the report would rest on. Blocking is the right move — but only after evidence has been preserved, never before.
Preserving digital evidence is a simple task that takes about fifteen minutes. Screenshot the entire conversation, not just the threatening message, so that the account name and the dates and times of the messages are visible. Copy the account's link or username letter for letter, and keep any phone number or wallet the money was asked to be sent to, along with the transfer receipt if a payment was actually made. Leave the messages exactly where they are and do not reset the phone; write down a timeline on paper — when the first message arrived, what was demanded, and what happened afterward.
As for where to file a report, the competent authority is the General Department for Information Technology at the Ministry of Interior, popularly known as the Internet Police (Mabahith al-Internet). According to Egyptian newspapers citing the Ministry's own announcements, the department takes reports through a hotline on 108, at its headquarters in First Settlement, New Cairo, at a unit in Abbasiya Square, and through an electronic service on the Ministry's website. Because phone numbers and addresses can change, the safest approach — as of this writing — is to confirm them on the official website, while the traditional route remains open as well: filing a police report at a police station, or a complaint with the Public Prosecution. Since 1 October 2026, the new Criminal Procedure Law No. 174 of 2025 has been in effect, replacing the 1950 law, and among other things it regulates the handling of digital evidence in proceedings — a change in procedure, not in what is criminalized.
As for procedure, the reporting authority requires — according to what has been published in the press — that the victim appear in person, or through a legal representative acting on their behalf, carrying their national ID card, the digital evidence, and the details of the incident. For women and girls specifically, the National Council for Women runs a Women's Complaints Office, which provides legal and social counseling along with initial psychological support through the hotline 15115, according to what the Council announces on its official website. Hiring a lawyer here is not a luxury; a lawyer is what ensures the report is worded correctly from the very first line, and protects the victim from having the report itself turned into grounds to blame them.
The real obstacle remains, and it is not legal but social: the fear of scandal at home outweighs the fear of publication itself. Many young women and men — including some under eighteen who are afraid their families will find out — would rather pay out of their own allowance than let anyone know. That is precisely the blackmailer's real capital: your silence. As we understand the legislation, the crimes under this law are not among those for which the legislator made prosecution conditional on a complaint from the victim, so the door to reporting is not closed to anyone, and having a parent or guardian, or a lawyer, alongside a minor only strengthens the case. Telling even one person you trust is the first step that strips the threat of its power, because something your family already knows can no longer be used as leverage against you.
Go back to that room at 1:30 in the morning. That first hour alone shapes what the following months will look like: no reply, no negotiating, no transfer — screenshots saved somewhere safe, messages left untouched, then a single word to someone you trust, and in the morning a report filed with your ID and your evidence, with a lawyer alongside you if at all possible. The blackmailer is betting that you will feel ashamed, stay silent, and pay; Law No. 175 of 2018, through Articles 14, 15, 24, 25, and 26, was written precisely so that bet loses. Turn off the screen and sleep if you can — because from the moment you file that report, the card they were holding becomes a card in your hand.
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